

On the Moral Blindness of Communism

Steven Lukes

Among the questions which *The Black Book of Communism* poses is one as old as Communism itself. It is a question that has been addressed from the beginning by its enemies and by its friends and, from within, by an unending succession of heretics and renegades, each reacting, as the saying goes, to his or her own Kronstadt (These are, of course, not mutually exclusive categories; as is shown by the perennial figure of the ex-Communist anti-Communist). All have asked the same question. What was the source of the disaster? Just where did it all go wrong?

They have offered different kinds of answer, which range from the maximally generic to the narrowly specific. The generic answers mostly come from Communism's enemies--reactionaries, conservatives, various kinds of liberals, and all those who came to be called Cold War thinkers. In countless different versions they claimed that the root of the catastrophe was (to cite only a few examples): the very legacy of the Enlightenment, including the idea of progress; "rationalism in politics"; utopianism; the Promethean myth; political messianism (Talmon); the belief that the course of history was scientifically knowable and its future course predictable (Popper's idiosyncratically named "historicism"); the "fatal conceit" that economic and social life could be brought under collective, rational control (Hayek); a scientific, ersatz religion based on the philosophical illusion of "the idea of perfect unity" to which genuine religion is an antidote (Kolakowski); or "monism" (Berlin)--"the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized."¹

Different thinkers in the Western tradition were variously seen as sowers of the seeds of eventual destruction: Plato and the Neo-Platonists, Rousseau, Hegel of course, and even the allegedly naively well-intentioned thinkers of the Enlightenment. On all such accounts, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism was viewed as the faithful historical implementation of one or another intellectual error responsible, in Berlin's words "for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals--justice or progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the

freedom of society."² According to this family of answers to the initial question, in short, some attractive and plausible way of thinking has led "to absurdities in theory and barbarous consequences in practice"³ – to the barbarity and mass slaughter of twentieth-century totalitarianism in its Communist variant.

Communism's disillusioned friends offered other diagnoses. From the Bolshevik Revolution onwards the disease was not seen as congenital but as contracted at a later stage—for the Mensheviks, Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg with Leninism, for Trotsky and his various followers with Stalinism. The canker was not now the idea but its implementation: in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or in the wrong way—through a minority dictatorship conducting a civil war against the majority (Kautsky), proclaiming socialism by decree and eliminating freedom of thought (Luxemburg), through a terroristic oligarchy, substituting the Party for the people, its leaders for the Party and the Supreme Leader for the leaders (Trotsky). Indeed Trotsky and the Trotskyites were always notably forthright about Stalinism's crimes and falsifications, however illusory their unshakeable belief that the Revolution had been "betrayed" and remained "unfinished."

As for the heretics and renegades, mostly in the West, their answers were many and various, colored in each case by personal experience, sometimes rendered the more vivid in powerful confessional writings characterizing the "god that failed," though after 1956 and, definitively after 1968, the supply of "true believers" and thus of apostasy ran dry. From such writings one can learn much about the distinctive appeal of the combination of Marxist belief and Communist commitment, above all under conditions of real danger where anti-fascism rightly seemed to have an overwhelmingly urgent priority. It was a winning combination that simultaneously offered explanation, justification and practical instructions: an elaborate but readily intelligible cognitive map of the entire social universe and indeed the whole span of human history that presupposed a universalistic picture of human liberation and entailed a clear-cut imperative of collective action, a package bound together by a doctrine of the indissoluble unity of theory and practice. No attempt to answer the question at hand can neglect to consider the powerful motivational force of such a comprehensive system, above all in a context of social and economic crisis and, for a significant time, impending military defeat, which it explained and from which it promised release. There were many diverse reasons for loss of faith, but chief among them was an ever-more pervasive awareness of the mounting disasters of "actually existing socialism."

In addition to which there are very substantial bodies of different kinds of literature addressing these disasters and reflecting on their causes. Prominent intellectuals, from Bertrand Russell and Tomas Masaryk to Sidney Hook and Raymond Aron, faced them from the beginning (Russell's *The Theory and Practice of Bolshevism* dates from 1921 and Masaryk's *The Making of a State* from

1927). After the Second World War there were abundant writings on "totalitarianism," beginning with Hannah Arendt's classic work. There were numerous academic studies by political scientists and historians of the Soviet system (Merle Fainsod, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Leonard Schapiro, Adam Ulam and many others) and of other Communist systems, some of the more critical, indeed, being Marxist or marxisant in inspiration (Barrington Moore, Herbert Marcuse), not to mention specific studies of the disasters themselves, such as Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror*. And then, of course, there was an ever-increasing flow of compelling writing of all kinds from within the disaster area (Pasternak, Mandelstam, Solzhenitsyn of course, and countless others from Russia and elsewhere) circulating as *samizdat* within and readily translated abroad.

Given all of this, how can Stephane Courtois write, in his Introduction to *The Black Book of Communism*, that "scholars have neglected the crimes committed by the Communists," that the "revelations" concerning these "cause barely a stir," and of a "deafening silence from the academic world regarding the Communist catastrophe" and of a "silence born of cowardliness or indifference" which is "the most tenacious in Western societies [sic] whenever the phenomenon of Communism came under the microscope."? And does he really believe that "Communism is again reasserting itself—in Eastern Europe and Russia"⁴? Doubtless John Torpey, in his contribution to this symposium, is right to attribute such eccentric judgments to the "persistent provincialism of the French intellectual scene." The old story of Communism's long-lasting hold over French intellectuals is not uninteresting and perhaps deserving of repeated study, but it is, after all, a local problem and one that is strictly irrelevant to the question with which I began and with which *The Black Book's* chief editor is concerned. Yet the rhetorical strategy of *The Black Book*, and more particularly of that editor, is that of a wake-up call, to break the supposed silence and "cause a stir" (in this it succeeded) by amassing all the currently available evidence of Communism's crimes within two covers. Comparison with the atrocities of Nazism makes obvious sense in the light of that rhetorical purpose. To juxtapose mega-death counts, to write that "the genocide of a 'class' may well be tantamount to the genocide of a 'race'"⁵ and suggest that the starvation of a Ukranian kulak child is "equal to" the starvation of a Jewish child in the Warsaw ghetto, and to point to the "animalization" of the adversary common to both Nazis and Communists is a good way to challenge, or perhaps pillory, any surviving leftists who are still able to believe that there are "no enemies on the left" at a time when "the Holocaust" has come to dominate, even obsess, the collective memory of the twentieth century. But are there really any such leftists left?

And were they ever, inside and outside France, so uniformly cowardly and indifferent towards, and willfully ignorant about, Communist crimes? Martin Malia, author of the Foreword to this United States edition of *The Black Book*,

endorses this suggestion, arguing that in the twentieth century, "morality is not primarily a matter of eternal verities or transcendental imperatives," but is "above all a matter of political allegiances. That is, it is a matter of left versus right..." In other words, Malia is here suggesting that the left, committed to "the priority of compassionate egalitarianism," is inherently blind to the consequences of the Communist project. Indeed, he claims, "we will always encounter a double standard as long as there exists a left and a right."⁶ But this is a polemically-driven travesty, disappointing in a historian who (rightly) commends this book for its reliance on the available evidence. It is denunciatory ideological talk, echoing the very practice of branding a group seen as an enemy that Courtois identifies as a distinguishing Communist trait. Pro-Sovietism and fellow-travelling were indubitably part of the story of the twentieth-century left in most places; but so, in most places, were principled opposition to and struggle against Communism in all its forms, from Kautsky (explicitly quoted to this effect by Courtois) onwards. Malia here diverges from his French colleague, by effectively *defining* the left as the political tendency immune to the book's message.

But Courtois' rhetorical strategy does not, in any case, assist his explanatory aim. Indeed it probably obstructs it. Courtois concludes his Introduction by asking what he describes as "the essential question, 'Why?' Why did Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and others believe it necessary to exterminate all those whom they had branded as 'enemies'? What made them imagine they could violate one of the basic tenets of civilization, 'Thou shalt not kill'?"⁷ It is not at all clear how the task of answering this question is furthered by Nazi-Communist comparisons. It is, of course, a general truth that anything can be compared with anything else; any particular comparison is to be justified by its likely explanatory payoff. There are, undoubtedly, many illuminating parallels to be explored in studying, for example, the organization of prison camps or the effects of propaganda and, in general, the dynamics of terror. But Courtois's "why" question is a question about the specificity of Communism, each national variant of which, he plausibly writes, "has been linked by an umbilical cord to the Soviet womb"—or (making the point even more clearly) "by a sort of genetic code of Communism" to "the pattern elaborated in Moscow in November 1917."⁸ So we do not want to know what was in common to the two cases which subverted or precluded "respect for the rules of a representative democracy and, above all, respect for life and human dignity."⁹ Rather we want to know what it was about *Communism* that had these momentous consequences.

Actually, the question "Why?"—the ambitiously promissory title of Courtois' concluding chapter to *The Black Book*—is, in this domain, a question that is, to put it mildly, far from simple. At its least simple it could be interpreted as an expression of incomprehension at the depth and scale of human cruelty—an incomprehension that derives from our general assumption, from which it is

hard to escape, that humans are, mostly, at some level and to some degree, humane, that they possess a range of human traits, including sympathy, pity and compassion, that must, we suppose, render such things impossible. It was, perhaps, in this sense that Primo Levi addressed the question "Why?" to a camp guard at Auschwitz and received the chilling answer "*Hier ist kein warum.*"¹⁰ And it is in response to this sense of "Why?" that Christopher Browning concludes his remarkable book *Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*, after hazarding several individually and jointly plausible explanations of what facilitated ordinary men's repeated participation and complicity in extreme atrocities, with the telling observation that one comes away from the story "with great unease."¹¹ For what none of these explanations can approach is an answer to the question: how could such things be possible?

But let us take Courtois' "Why?" in the simpler sense that he himself specifies: why did the Communist leaders 'believe it necessary to exterminate all those whom they had branded as "enemies"? He goes on to amplify and extend his understanding of this "fundamental question":

Why did modern Communism, when it appeared in 1917, almost immediately turn into a system of bloody dictatorship and into a criminal regime? Was it really the case that its aims could be attained only through such extreme violence? How can one explain how these crimes came to be thought of as part of normal procedure and remained such for so many decades?¹²

How far does he, together with his fellow contributors, take us in answering this set of questions? The answer must, I fear, be: not far at all. Thus we are reminded of the tradition of revolutionary violence stemming from the Terror during the French Revolution, of the Russian culture of violence from above and below, and of the violence of the world war and its post-war impact; of the Leninist innovatory conception of the revolutionary party and illusory hope of imminent world revolution; of the Bolsheviks' appeal to "scientific" warrant for their faith, their manipulation of language and their rejection of representative democracy in favor of a systematic war mentality; of the next stage of systematic and contagious terror under Stalin, with the executioners becoming victims, first criminalizing, then excluding and finally exterminating the enemy (though in Asia there was a distinctive belief in "re-education") and of the de-humanizing, sometimes "animalizing" rhetoric employed. It would, of course, be absurd to expect originality here. There is no particular reason to suppose that the composite *explanandum* of *The Black Book*, gathering together inventories of Communism's crimes across the globe, is likely to generate some hitherto unsuspected *explanans*. But it might perhaps have generated some fresh or at least structured synthesis of the familiar factors heretofore listed, yielding, for instance, some insight into the iterative logic of revolution and

counter-revolution, as for example in Arno Mayer's recent book, *The Furies. Violence and Terror in French and Russian Revolutions*.¹³

Instead what we get is an encyclopaedia of terror, as indicated by crimes against civilians. Focussing explicitly on these, *The Black Book* provides a comprehensive and, it would seem, reliable catalogue, given presently available sources, of their extent, nature and incidence. We learn, in short, "how many", "how", "when", and "where." It is a devastating record of human disaster, all the more effective and affecting when it is dryly factual and statistical, avoiding, in Primo Levi's phrase, "the lamenting tones of the victim" and "the irate voice of someone who seeks revenge."¹⁴ In this significant respect the bulk of the book contrasts favorably with the moralizing tones of its Introduction and Conclusion and, in particular, its Foreword in which Professor Malia deplors a "fact-for-fact's-sake approach" and informs us that moral judgment is "inseparable from any real understanding of the past—indeed, inseparable from being human."¹⁵

But the "why" question will not go away. Let us recall Courtois' first formulation of its import: why did the Communist leaders "believe it necessary to exterminate all those whom they had branded as 'enemies'"? Clearly, any attempt at answering this must point in several directions: to a study of their *beliefs*, their origins, content and structure, their inculcation and transmission within the Communist movements and parties, through texts, but also party schools, symbolism and ritual, and generally, an examination of Communist political culture; but also to a study of the constraints and opportunities they faced, in revolutionary, post-revolutionary and non-revolutionary situations. To what extent, we would need to know, were their beliefs about what was *necessary*, given their goals, justified? To what extent were they driven and blinded by ideology? Were there alternative paths of Communist development that were never taken? How did their beliefs interact with their constraints and opportunities? Such historical (including counterfactual-historical) questions remain alive and open; and, although *The Black Book* makes no progress in answering them, its sheer accumulation of factual material should be indispensable to future attempts to do so.

There is, however, a less ambitious version of the "why" question on which something even now can, perhaps, usefully be said. Courtois asks why the Communist leaders believed it "*necessary* to exterminate all those whom they had branded as 'enemies.'" But suppose we replace "*necessary*" here with "*possible*." Are there features of their system of beliefs that can account for their lack of moral restraint? This seems an appropriate question to ask in the pages of this journal. Did the Communist leaders have beliefs that allowed them not to take human rights seriously?

Both Malia and Courtois refer to Marx's picture of the communist future as latent in the womb of the capitalist present, a picture tellingly expressed in the metaphor of the revolutionary as midwife. It was a disastrous picture, absolv-

ing both the theorists and practitioners of revolution from both moral deliberation and institutional planning, since, as Thomas Nagel has well put it, "midwives do not have to design the babies they deliver."¹⁶ (They do not normally use violence either, but here, it seems, the metaphor was subject to interpretation).

The metaphor is revealing, but it does not reveal what was so powerfully attractive and inspiring about Marx's vision as transmitted to his successors. This is best captured by another metaphor, that of "emancipation." Like the midwife metaphor, it dispenses the revolutionary from moral judgment (since there is no need to ask whether slavery is to be condemned or criticized). But it also suggests, through a series of extreme contrasts, a compelling vision of the future of mankind, the End, not of History, but of Pre-history. For what Marxism, and subsequently Communism in all its variants, promised was liberation, not only from the wage-slavery of capitalism, but from those very conditions of human life that render rights in general, and human rights in particular, necessary. Briefly (and without entering into various academic controversies about how to analyze rights), we may say that human beings need rights to protect their central and basic interests in the face of threatening existential conditions that are to be found in all hitherto existing societies. Two of these were identified by David Hume as what rendered justice necessary: selfishness and scarcity, or as Hume put it, the "confined generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants."¹⁷ Both of these need some elaboration and specification, but, basically, the idea in each case is clear. Being selfish, or at least not perfect altruists, individuals and groups pursue their partial or particular interests which sometimes get in the way of others who need protections from such invasions. As for scarcity, not all good things can be had by all and, indeed, some are inherently scarce (such as time and positional goods), and so principles are needed to specify who is entitled to what. Two further existential conditions can be added to these: the plurality of values and imperfect rationality. Here too elaboration and specification are needed, but the central idea is, once more, in each case clear. Plural values mean that human ends and conceptions of what is valuable in life are irreducibly diverse and often incompatible, and so people need protection to be able to pursue their own course: the idea that conflicting values can be rendered harmonious is an illusion and any attempt to do so can only result in tyranny. And humans are imperfectly rational because their capacity to absorb and control information and to predict and control their environment, natural and social, has significant limits (though there are of course different views about where these lie): so social and individual lives need protection against illusory and misguided attempts to control them on the basis of knowledge that is inherently unattainable. Let us call these four conditions "conditions of morality" (for they are at least conditions for that part of morality occupied by ideas of human rights).

The promise of Marxism was precisely to free humankind from these conditions of morality: from scarcity (through unlimited development of the forces of production, especially once released from the fetters of capitalist relations of production); from the selfishness or partiality of conflicting individuals and groups (which Marx explained as deriving from class interests and class conflict); from non-convergent and incompatible values (tied to religious or cultural differences that would wither away since these too were linked to class); and from the anarchy and opacity of a world not subject to collective human control (as opposed to a future transparent world of "associated producers" in full control of their natural and social environment). Emancipation, in short, was to be emancipation from the conditions that rendered human beings' interests precarious and in need of the guarantees that constitute rights and human rights in particular. Communism was the promise of a world beyond justice and rights, in which individuals would flourish, free from alienation and exploitation, in a unified society of abundance, free of religious and cultural particularity and conflict and in full, transparent control of their economic and political life.

These, I believe, are parametric features of the structure of Marxist thinking, fully present and articulated in the classic texts of Marx and Engels and reproduced throughout the canon. They were constitutive of the tradition, which was, of course, highly bibliocentric, and so were taught in Party schools everywhere that Communist culture was transmitted. Taken together they tend to subvert all talk of morality and concern with equal human dignity or with human rights. (And throughout their writings Marx and Engels were scornful of such talk, as indeed were virtually all the mainstream Marxist thinkers after them¹⁸). For if you really believed that history offers a route to a world in which scarcity, selfishness, particularistic narrowness, and subjection to an economic system beyond political control would wither away, why would you flinch from whatever you thought necessary to bring it about? In this respect, one could say, Marxism offered the emancipating vision of a world in which the principles that protect human beings from one another would no longer be needed. How could it then be justifiable to respect and act on those principles if doing so would block or even delay the advent of such a world? As Bertolt Brecht asked,

If at last you could change the world, what

Could make you too good to do so?¹⁹

If emancipation required what Nicholas Werth calls "an implacable class war pushed to its extreme,"²⁰ why would you not fight it?

We should probably assume (though we can never know for sure) that at least sometimes Communist leaders believed themselves to be facing just this

choice. Assuming this would make non-cynical sense of two passages quoted by Courtois. The first is from Isaac Sternberg, a left Socialist Revolutionary allied with the Bolsheviks:

Old-fashioned violence is merely a protection against slavery, while the new violence is the painful path towards emancipation....That is what should be decisive in our choice. We should take violence into our own hands to be sure that we bring about the end of violence.²¹

The second passage is from Gorky describing Lenin:

...he told me once as he was stroking some children, "their lives will be better than ours: they'll be spared many of the things we have been forced to live through. Their lives will be less cruel." He stared off into the distance, and added dreamily, "Mind you, I don't envy them. Our generation will have carried out a task of tremendous historical importance. The cruelty of our lives, imposed by circumstances, will be understood and pardoned. Everything will be understood, everything."²²

And Brecht voiced the same sentiment thus:

You who will emerge from the flood

In which we have gone under

Remember

When you speak of our failings

The dark time too

Which you have escaped.²³

But what of Communism's "ordinary men"? How did the belief structure I have identified influence them? I conclude these observations by quoting at some length the precious testimony of Lev Kopelev, on whom Rubin, the staunchly Communist linguist in Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle*, was modelled:

With the rest of my generation I firmly believed that the ends justified the means. Our great goal was the universal triumph of Communism, and for the sake of that goal everything was permissible – to lie, to steal, to destroy hundreds of thousands and even millions of people, all those who were hindering our work or could hinder it, everyone who stood in the way. And to hesitate or doubt about all this was to give in to "intellectual squeamishness" and "stupid liberalism," the attributes of people who "could not see the forest for the trees."

That was how I had reasoned, and everyone like me, even when I did have my doubts, when I believed what Trotsky and Bukharin were saying, when I saw what "total collectivization" meant—how they "kulakized" and "dekulakized," how mercilessly they stripped the peasants in the winter of 1932-3. I took part in this myself, scouring the countryside, searching for hidden grain, testing the earth with an iron rod for loose spots that might lead to buried grain. With the others, I emptied out the old folks' storage chests, stopping my ears to the children's crying and the women's wails. For I was convinced that I was accomplishing the great and necessary transformation of the countryside; that in the days to come the people who lived there would be better off for it; that their distress and suffering were a result of their own ignorance or the machinations of the class enemy; that those who sent me—and I myself—knew better than the peasants how they should live, what they should sow and when they should plough.

In the terrible spring of 1933 I saw people dying from hunger. I saw women and children with distended bellies, turning blue, still breathing but with vacant, lifeless eyes. And corpses—corpses in ragged sheepskin coats and cheap felt boots; corpses in peasant huts, in the melting snow of the old Vologda, under the bridges of Kharkov. I saw all this and did not go out of my mind or commit suicide. Nor did I curse those who had sent me to take away the peasants' grain in the winter, and in the spring to persuade the barely walking, skeleton-thin or sickly-swollen people to go into the fields in order to "fulfil the Bolshevik sowing plan in shock-worker style."

Nor did I lose my faith. As before, I believed because I wanted to believe. Thus from time immemorial men have believed when possessed by a desire to serve powers and values above and beyond humanity: gods, emperors, states; ideals of virtue, freedom, nation, race, class, party...

Any single-minded attempt to realize these ideals exacts its toll of human sacrifice. In the name of the noblest visions promising eternal happiness to their descendants, such men bring merciless ruin on their contemporaries. Bestowing paradise on the dead, they maim and destroy the living. They become unprincipled liars and unrelenting executioners, all the while seeing themselves as virtuous and honourable militants – convinced that if they are forced into villainy, it is for the sake of future good, and that if they have to lie, it is in the name of eternal truths.

Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein

So schlag ich dir dein Schadel ein.

[And if you won't be my brother

I'll crack your skull open]

they sing in a Landsknecht song.

That was how we thought and acted—we, the fanatical disciples of the all-saving ideals of Communism. When we saw the base and cruel acts that were committed in the name of our exalted notions of good, and we ourselves took part in those actions, what we feared most was to lose our heads, fall into doubt or heresy and forfeit our unbounded faith.

I was appalled by what I saw in the 1930s and was overcome by depression. But I would still my doubts the way I had learned to: “we made a mistake,” “we went too far,” “we didn’t take into consideration,” “the logic of the class struggle,” “objective historical need,” “using barbaric means to combat barbarism.”

Good and evil, humanity and inhumanity—these seemed empty abstractions. I did not trouble myself with why “humanity” should be abstract but “historical necessity” and “class consciousness” should be concrete. The concepts of conscience, honor, humaneness we dismissed as idealistic prejudices, “intellectual” or “bourgeois,” and hence, perverse.²⁴

So, how to answer the question with which I began? Obviously, there is no one answer. But if we interpret the question to be asking whether there were specific beliefs central to the culture of Communism everywhere that made its crimes against humanity possible, then the answer has to be affirmative. The defect in question, causing moral blindness on a heroic scale, was congenital.

Notes

1. Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), p.169
2. *Ibid.*, p. 167
3. *Ibid.*, p. lvi
4. Stephane Courtois et al., *The Black Book of Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repression* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 17, 26, 28
5. *The Black Book*, p. 9
6. *The Black Book*, pp. xvi, xvii, xx
7. *The Black Book*, p. 31
8. *The Black Book*, pp. 28, 754
9. *The Black Book*, p. 30
10. Primo Levi, *If This is a Man and The Truce* (London, Abacus edition, Sphere Books), 1987, p. 35
11. Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York, Harper/Collins, 1992), p. 188
12. *The Black Book*, p. 727
13. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000
14. Primo Levi, *If This is a Man and The Truce*, p. 382
15. *The Black Book*, p. xvi
16. Thomas Nagel, ‘Getting Personal’, review of G. A. Cohen, *If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re so Rich* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000), *Times Literary Supplement*, June 23, 2000, p. 6. Cohen’s book discusses the midwife metaphor.
17. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888, reprinted 1951), p. 495

18. For numerous examples, see Steven Lukes, *Marxism and Morality* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1985), in which the foregoing argument is spelt out at greater length. See also 'Can a Marxist believe in Human Rights?' in Steven Lukes, *Moral Conflict and Politics* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991)
19. Bertolt Brecht, *The Measure Taken and Other Lehrstucke* (London, Eyre Methuen, 1977), p. 25
20. *The Black Book*, p. 75
21. *The Black Book*, p. 744
22. *The Black Book*, p. 756
23. Bertolt Brecht, 'To Those Born Later' in Bertolt Brecht, *Poems 1913-1956* (London, Methuen, 1956), p. 319
24. Lev Kopelev, *No Jail for Thought* (Harmondsworth, Penguin edition, 1979), pp. 32-34

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.